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An Entrepreneurial Transition? Development
and Economic Mobility in Rural Tibet
This paper documents the rise of entrepreneurs in rural Tibet, a process that started in the 1980s and gained
considerable momentum in the wake of China’s Develop the West Campaign launched in 2000. The authors
describe economic transformations in rural Tibet from 1959 to the present, and present case studies of
entrepreneurs to show how some Tibetans are capitalizing on new economic opportunities that stem both
directly and indirectly from government development policies. Whereas many critics allege that China’s
development initiatives benefit rural Tibetans only marginally, today’s rural entrepreneurs illustrate how some
Tibetans are successfully negotiating the new matrix of opportunities. However, because Tibet’s economy is
highly dependent on government investments, it is unclear whether the increase in entrepreneurial activities
is sustainable over the long-term. Nevertheless, the case studies demonstrate several entrepreneurial
pathways to upward mobility that are currently available, including farm-based initiatives, construction
contracting, cottage industry, and retail business.

INTRODUCTION
Recent economic developments have transformed
rural Tibet1 in significant and sometimes unanticipated
ways. Although some critics allege that China’s
development initiatives do not benefit rural Tibetans,
or do so only marginally, we present evidence that
many Tibetans are successfully adapting to rapid
changes induced by government policies. This paper
documents the rise of rural entrepreneurs in Tibet and
the increasing scale and diversity of their economic
endeavors. Herein, we define an entrepreneur as
a person who organizes and manages a business
undertaking, assuming risk in a quest for profit. In
order to qualify as an entrepreneur, one must engage
in economic activities that require capital investment
and entail a degree of financial risk.
The upsurge of entrepreneurial activities in rural
Tibet may seem counterintuitive given the bleak
picture painted by some studies. For example,
Fischer points out that Tibetan migrants to cities must
compete for jobs on an uneven playing field against
higher skilled in-migrants from other areas of China
(2005:132-133, see also Fischer this volume and
Yeh and Henderson 2008), an observation echoed
by Wang (2009) who notes how China’s “Open
1.“Tibet” in this paper refers to the Tibet Autonomous Region,
which corresponds roughly to the territory ruled by the Dalai Lama
at the time that it was incorporated into the PRC in 1951.

Policy” on in-migration has encouraged people from
other regions to establish small businesses in Tibet.
In urban areas, competition from non-Tibetans who
have more education and experience places Tibetans
at a disadvantage when it comes to starting successful
businesses. As a consequence, many niches for
entrepreneurial activities are filled before Tibetans
have even acquired the skills or capital to enter into
competition (Wang 2009:14). Although Fischer and
Wang shed an important spotlight on inter-ethnic
economic competition in cities, the urban focus of
their studies does not inform us of developments
in the rural countryside where the overwhelming
majority of Tibetans continue to live—a void in
research that this paper seeks to redress.
In this paper we describe economic developments
in our rural Tibetan fieldwork sites, and then
present case studies to show how some Tibetans are
capitalizing on new economic opportunities that stem
both directly and indirectly from the government’s
development policies. We conclude by discussing the
potential that entrepreneurs have for changing the
social and economic landscape of rural Tibet.
RESEARCH SITES AND METHODS
Between 2006 and 2009, we conducted four
stints of fieldwork for a total of approximately nine
months in three villages in Tibet’s Shigatse Prefecture
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to investigate the impact of modernization on rural families.
The three villages, while not selected to represent all of Tibet,
lie within a major agricultural corridor running between
Tibet’s two largest cities, Lhasa and Shigatse, which contains
about 30 per cent of Tibet’s population. They were selected
to meet a research design comparing a continuum of villages
from relatively wealthy to relatively poor (more to less affected
by modernization). Two of these villages were also part of
an earlier study by Goldstein and colleagues (Goldstein
et al. 2003). Sogang, the least affected by development, is
located in Panam County in the upper (mountainous) part
of a tributary river valley, while Norgyong, the intermediate
site, is situated below Sogang on the main river. Norgyong is
located immediately beside the county seat in Panam. Betsag,
the third site, is located only 10 kilometers from Shigatse
City and was included to represent a wealthy farming village
that is more heavily affected by mechanized agriculture and
government development programs. Despite these economic
differences, the three villages are geographically close and are
part of the same Tibetan sub-ethnic cultural and linguistic
zone. Table 1 provides some basic demographic details about
the villages.
Village

Households

Population

Mean
household size

Mean income
per household
(2005)

Sogang

92

665

7.2

10,332¥

Norgyong

124

853

6.9

24,112¥

Betsag

93

712

7.7

35,759¥

Table 1: Summary of Fieldwork Sites, 2006. Note: At the time of our
fieldwork in 2006-2009 the average exchange rate was 7.5¥ to $1.00. Source:
Goldstein, Childs and Wangdui 2008.

The primary focus of our research on intergenerational
relations and the shifting status of the elderly necessitated
that we document the enormous changes sweeping rural
Tibet in the wake of China’s push to modernize the economy.
As a component of this research, we interviewed over 50
individuals who earn income through non-farm employment.
The data presented in this paper are drawn from those indepth interviews.2
The villages and families we studied have undergone
several major socio-economic transformations over the
past six decades. Traditionally, the families were part of the
Tibetan manorial estate system and thereby were hereditarily
bound to estates and lords. There were important differences
within villages; some families were landless while others
held hereditary usufruct rights to agricultural land from
their lords and estates. Families with land farmed for their
subsistence, and in return incurred a heavy tax burden in
farm produce, corveé labor, and other obligations. Their
2. For further details on these village see Goldstein, Childs, and
Wangdui (2008, 2010) and Childs, Goldstein, and Wangdui (2011).
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main unit of production and consumption was the corporate
family, named family entities that existed across generations.
Their main strategy for increasing their wealth and power
was to concentrate male labor in the family and prevent
the fragmentation of their family’s landholding through the
marital practice of fraternal polyandry (see Goldstein 1971).
Manorial estates in Tibet ended after the failed 1959 revolt,
and these villages became part of a new socialist political and
economic system. A few years later, the state forcibly organized
all villages and families into agricultural communes. Farm
work was now organized by a small number of commune
managers. Family members worked at tasks assigned by the
managers so families were no longer units of production as
they had no land of their own. Fraternal polyandry was no
longer practiced, and in fact was banned by the government.
Although meant to improve agricultural production, the
commune system worked poorly. In conjunction with the
ideological excesses of the Cultural Revolution, the system
impoverished the rural population and even led to a series
of revolts in 1969 (see Goldstein, Jiao, and Lhudrup 2009).
The next major change occurred in 1978-79 when Deng
Xiaoping came to power, eliminated communes, implemented
market economics and valorized the profit motive. In Tibet,
communes were dissolved in 1980-81 and were replaced by
the “Household Responsibility System” which again allowed
families to function as units of production and consumption.
The government distributed all commune land to its members
on a per capita basis so that every person alive at the date of
redistribution received one equal share as a long-term lease.
A household consisting of seven members thereby received
seven shares of land. The traditional Tibetan corporate family
ideal quickly reemerged along with a revival of fraternal
polyandry (Jiao 2001; Goldstein et al. 2002; Fjeld 2006).
Keeping landholdings intact across generations was again a
major objective because a family’s land was given as a longterm lease from the state and could not be bought or sold.
Therefore, there was no way to replace land that would be lost
if a son married out of the household and claimed his rightful
share (Goldstein et al. 2002).
The Household Responsibility System led to immediate
improvements in the standard of living (Goldstein et. al.
2003), but several factors since 1982 have steadily eroded
families’ landholdings both in absolute and per capita terms.
These included the natural increase of the population due to
births exceeding deaths, the government’s practice of using
eminent domain to claim agricultural land for development
projects, the loss of land through flooding and other forces
of nature, and the use by families of some of their farmland
for constructing new houses. Between 1982 and 1997 the
amount of land per capita declined by 32 percent in Sogang
and 33 percent in Norgyong.3
The new corporate families compensated for this, as
3. These figures were derived from Goldstein, Jiao, Beall and Tsering’s
1998 survey, and do not include Betsag because that village was not
included in the 1998 survey.

well as for rising inflation and a shift of some expenses
such as health care from the state to the family, by sending
household members outside the village in search of wagelabor opportunities. By 1997, rural Tibetans in sizable
numbers were seeking to supplement household incomes by
engaging in non-farm economic opportunities. Specifically, in
1997 nearly 50 percent of rural households in our sample
had at least one member engaged in non-farm labor for part
of the year, and the number could have been higher had
there not been a dearth of jobs in the construction industry
which many Tibetans blamed on the influx of non-Tibetan
migrant workers (Goldstein et al. 2003). Moreover, private
entrepreneurs began to emerge albeit their numbers and
ambitions were modest compared to the present.
Economic opportunities for Tibetans increased dramatically
in the wake of China’s Develop the West Campaign (Ch. xibu
da kaifa). Launched in 2000, the campaign aimed to redress
the widening gap between China’s relatively wealthy east
and comparatively poor west, including Tibet, by infusing
billions of dollars into development projects.4 In Tibet the
government directed most initial expenditures toward large
infra-structure projects such as highways, buildings, and the
railway to Lhasa. At the commencement of the Develop the
West Campaign, private enterprises in rural Tibet were either
too small-scale to be noticed in official economic statistics,
or virtually nonexistent. In 2001, state-owned units in Tibet
were the source of 95 percent of investments in fixed assets for
the region, and as Fischer notes, “very little formal investment
takes place in the rural areas between the micro investments
by households and the large-scale projects of the state sector”
(2005:71-72).
A “People First” (Ch. yiren weiben; Tib. mi rtsa bar ’dzin)
dimension was added to the Develop the West Campaign
in 2006 to place more emphasis on social improvements
and provide farmers with market opportunities for rural
products.5 The centerpiece of the People First initiative, called
the “Comfortable Housing Program” (Ch. anju gongcheng;
Tib. bde sdod rnam grangs), aimed between 2006 and 2010
to provide direct subsidies to 80 percent of Tibet’s rural
households so they could upgrade the quality of their houses.6
4. For general discussions of this campaign, see Lai (2002), Goodman
(2004), and Holbig (2004).
5. Additionally, the Panam Integrated Rural Development Project
(PIRDP) was undertaken in our research area between 2001 and 2005 as a
collaboration between the European Union and the government of China.
The government chose Panam County (where Sogang and Norgyong are
located), Gyantse County, and Shigatse City (which includes Betsag) as
“model areas for modernizing agriculture in Tibet” (Kaiser and Dui 2005).
One impact in Betsag was the cross-breeding of hybrid cows with local
animals to improve milk production.
6. Reports from Human Rights Watch (2006) and Robin (2009)
allege that the government forces Tibetans to participate in the Comfortable
Housing Program, compels them to build houses that are incompatible
with traditional lifestyles, and impoverishes Tibetans by causing massive
indebtedness. To the contrary, our own research shows that participation is
voluntary, housing design is flexible, people are confident of their ability to
repay loans, and most have positive opinions about the program (Goldstein,
Childs, and Wangdui 2010). The reports by Human Rights Watch and

Although the subsidies ranging from 8,000¥ to 12,000¥ only
covered 15-20 percent of the cost to rebuild, the program’s
popularity across the Tibetan Plateau led to a high demand for
skilled labor as thousands of families began to rebuild their
houses. Nearly half the 330 households in our three research
villages participated during the program’s first four years
(Goldstein, Childs, and Wangdui 2010).
Massive expenditures associated with the Develop the
West Campaign further stimulated the emerging wage-labor
market in Tibet. By 2005 over 90 percent of households in
our research villages had at least one income earner, and
over half had two or more (Goldstein, Childs, and Wangdui
2008). Table 2 provides a perspective on the emphasis rural
Tibetans now place on non-farm labor as a component of
their household economic strategy. Note the large increases
in the percentages of males and females aged 20-39 who earn
incomes.
Village
Sogang
Norgyong
Betsag

Age
20-29
30-39
20-29
30-39
20-29
30-39

Males
1997
18.0
25.5
28.4
29.3

2005
69.2
71.7
63.7
63.5
63.3
70.8

Females
1997
2005
7.4
31.9
2.1
16.7
2.5
28.0
6.8
28.3
13.6
22.0

Table 2: Percent Earning Income by Age Category and Village. Source:
Goldstein, Childs and Wangdui 2008.

Such a large increase in off-farm labor opportunities
is typically associated with a shift from farming to urbanbased economic activities. Fischer (this volume) reports that,
according to official statistics, the proportion of the labor
force engaged in farming and herding has declined from 76
percent in 1999 to 56 percent in 2008, thereby suggesting
a rapid decline of the rural farm sector is underway. While
there has certainly been permanent migration from our study
villages to urban areas, we find that going outside the village
to earn cash income does not necessitate abandoning the rural
sector and the farm economy. In Tibetan corporate families,
the head of the household assigns tasks to its members, and
one such task is to go outside the village to earn income.7
For example, a person might leave home after the New Year
holiday and spend the next seven months working elsewhere,
then return to help with the autumn harvest and remain at
home through the following New Year. Afterwards, he might
go to a city to seek seasonal employment, or find work on a
construction project in the countryside, or even stay home
Robin were based on information gathered from afar, whereas our report
was based on in situ research that included extensive interviews with
project participants and local government officials.
7. This is not a new practice. In the traditional society richer
households often sent a son with the family’s team of donkeys or mules to
earn income by transporting goods to and from India. Such individuals
would stay outside the village for months at a time, similar to migrant
laborers today.

An Entrepreneurial Transition?/Childs, Goldstein, and Wangdui 53

and have another family member go outside the village to
make their way to urban areas on a permanent basis, leaving
earn income that year.
the old and infirm behind as is found in many parts of the
Based on our household surveys, first-hand observations,
world. While some people have left permanently, our study
and in-depth interviews with seasonal laborers, we suggest
villages which are close to Tibet’s second largest city, Shigatse,
that statistics on the decline of rural labor, such as those cited
remain vibrant centers of social and economic activity.
above, are misThe
above
leading. In our
discussion of ofsample the maficial statistics and
jority of migrant
their implications
laborers were not
is important given
even working in
the context of this
urban areas. More
paper’s focus on
important, most
rural
entrepredid not move fullneurs. If a major
time but remained
shift from rural
members of their
to urban employvillage households
ment is underway,
in both adminisand if the majority
trative terms (as
of entrepreneurial
recorded in resiopportunities are
dence documents)
concentrated in
and
practical
cities, then aspirterms (they remiting Tibetan ented earnings to the
trepreneurs will
household head,
face considerable
retained full rights
obstacles due to
to their share of
competition from
Rural Tibetans favor mechanized farming nowadays because it frees them to pursue income
the family’s land,
non-Tibetan migenerating opportunities outside the village. Photo: Geoff Childs
and were often cogrants who tend to
husbands in a polyandrous marriage). They saw themselves
be more educated, have access to more capital, and possess
and were seen by their families as integral parts of their rural
a better understanding of how to navigate China’s business
households. Our findings are supported by survey research
bureaucracy. But if the countryside remains a vibrant compoconducted among migrant laborers in 2005 that found the
nent of Tibet’s economy, and if the countryside remains prevast majority of migrant laborers in Lhasa (78.8 percent)
dominantly Tibetan, then rural entrepreneurs will operate on
planned to return home (Ma and Lhundup 2008).
a more level playing field that enhances their chances for sucOne problem with China’s labor statistics is that people
cess. The case studies that follow document ways that some
are frequently classified as non-farm or urban laborers when
rural Tibetans are negotiating today’s matrix of opportunities.
they are actually firmly rooted in the village and the cash
they earn is part of their farm household’s overall income. It
FARM-BASED INITIATIVES IN RURAL TIBET
is well-known that government officials have a tendency to
Raising Animals for the Urban Meat Market
skew statistics to fit certain agendas. On one hand, the TAR
In 2006, as part of the People First initiative, China
government wants to show progress with Tibet’s urbanization,
launched scores of programs across Tibet to encourage
a statistic used throughout China as a marker of development
farmers to raise animals for urban meat markets (Goldstein,
and modernization (see Yeh and Henderson 2008). On the
Childs, and Wangdui 2010). Before this program, however,
other hand, classifying more people as urban laborers allows
some Tibetans had already started enterprises to raise animals
urban areas to receive greater amounts of funding for services.
for profit. For example, when Pasang8 returned to his village
The shift implied by government statistics is, to a considerin the 1980s after military service, he purchased a horse and
able extent, an artifact of misclassifying seasonal rural migrant
cart to collect recyclable materials such as scrap iron and
laborers as urban workers. Consequently, the tremendous inbottles for resale. Although this modest enterprise earned
crease in the numbers of villagers going outside to earn inhim a decent livelihood, Pasang faced increasing competition
come does not imply a parallel shift in population from rural
from non-Tibetan migrants who nowadays dominate the rural
to urban areas as government statistics suggest. Supporting
recycling market. He decided to try something different,
evidence comes from our research on rural households over
many years. We find that the Tibetan countryside is not typified by a large number of young people leaving villages to
8. All names used in this paper are pseudonyms.
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I felt that Tibet was developing, that the
population was growing quickly, and that
there was a shortage of meat in the market. I
recognized there would be a market, so I started
feeding pigs and sheep [in 1991]. . . . Meat
prices were rising quickly, so I took a chance.

More recently, Pasang capitalized on a program to increase
the size of local sheep by cross-breeding them with animals
from Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. Because he could speak
Chinese, a skill acquired during his military service, Pasang
was selected as a local representative. He invested several
thousand yuan to purchase imported sheep, and also started
raising pigs for slaughter.
Pasang sells 20-30 pigs and 40-50 sheep annually,
and keeps 20-30 pigs and 50-60 sheep on hand to increase
herd sizes for the subsequent year. He prefers to sell sheep
from April to August, prior to the time when nomads drive
prices down by inundating the market with their animals.
Pasang’s buyers are Hui butchers from Shigatse who pay
up to 300¥ for his sheep—considerably more than the
usual price of 100¥ for local sheep. After accounting for his
original purchase price and the cost of rearing each animal, he
estimates a net profit of 150¥ per sheep. In addition, he sells
the wool locally and some of the dung as fertilizer to nearby
greenhouses. Pasang then replenishes his herd by purchasing
animals from nomads when they descend from the highlands.
Pigs require a shorter time to fatten, so Pasang considers
raising them to be more lucrative than sheep. He grows some
pig fodder (beans) on his own land, purchases some fodder
from the market, and obtains some by exchanging entrails
for restaurant leftovers in a nearby town. Because Pasang’s
sows are renowned for their size and quality, he is able to
supplement his income by selling piglets locally at a price of
135-160¥ per head. He feeds boars for one year and sows for
two years before selling them for slaughter; his largest pigs
sell for 1,400¥.
Although many farmers and herders throughout Tibet
raise and sell some of their animals for profit, most do so
as a minor extension of their mainstay farming and herding
activities. We consider Pasang to be an entrepreneur because
his business depends on raising capital through bank loans or
by re-investing profits from sales, and because he takes risks
in the pursuit of profits. Pasang estimates his net income from
the animal rearing enterprise to be roughly 30,000¥ per year.
This elevates his household’s net income to 36,002¥, which
is considerably higher than Norgyong’s average of 24,112¥.
A Rural Cheese Production Facility
In 2001 an EU-sponsored project introduced a breed
of cows to villages near Shigatse that produces more milk
than local bovines. Khangchen, a household in Betsag, took
advantage of the milk surplus produced by the new cows by
starting a small cheese production facility. Initially, the family
received a 4,000¥ grant from the government and sold their

cheese in the Shigatse market. Khangchen’s cheese became
so popular that people started coming to their house to
buy it, prompting a need to expand production which the
Shigatse city government facilitated through a 13,000¥ grant.
According to the head of the Khangchen household, the local
township and city governments supported their enterprise
in an effort to promote his family as an exemplar for how a
rural household can become wealthy. The facility currently
employs three people from poor households and sells most
of their product at a store the family owns in Shigatse. A few
other local facilities produce a similar style of cheese, but
Khangchen cheese has achieved such fame that, “Until our
cheese is sold out, nobody else can sell their cheese.”
Khangchen’s net profit from cheese production in 2005
was 52,000¥. This brought their net income for that year
to 61,138¥, considerably higher than Betsag’s average of
35,759¥. Recently, the family expanded their marketing to
Lhasa by participating in government-sponsored trade fairs.
In 2007 they were negotiating with a major department store
to provide them with another urban sales outlet. The family
plans to build a new facility that is double in size and employs
10-15 workers, and is trying to get a registered trade-mark for
their product.
Bricks for Construction
The rapid expansion of cities and towns is providing many
rural households with a new entrepreneurial opportunity:
using their land to make mud bricks for building construction.
Production is a simple process. Betsag became a center for
brick production because it lies adjacent to a main road and is
only ten kilometers from the center of Shigatse. After flooding
a section of a field, workers mix mud together with straw,
then transfer it into wooden moulds placed in the open air to
dry. Finished bricks are stacked beside a road in preparation
for transport to a construction site. Much of Betsag’s original
brick production used soil excavated from marginal, nonirrigated fields. In recent years, however, villagers began using
dirt from prime agricultural land.
Ngödrup, an industrious man in his late forties, was a
forerunner for this local industry. He recalls,
In 1996 I owned a car, but had an accident and
broke many bones. I owed the bank 30,000¥.
Everyone knew I was a driver, and that I couldn’t
do manual labor, and the township government
knew I was in debt. So they gave me some empty
land. A township official said, “If you work hard
at making bricks you can repay the debt.” I
had no other choice, so my wife and I started
making bricks. We sold the bricks, covered our
daily expenses, saved, borrowed, and bought a
tractor. I then saved money to hire others [to
make the bricks] and began to transport the
bricks to Shigatse. In two years I cleared the
debt. Last year I borrowed 28,000¥ from the
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bank. I bought another small tractor, and with
the remainder paid the workers. I sold bricks
worth 40,000¥, which gave me a net profit of
16,000¥.

Today, Betsag’s major brick producers employ workers
from other villages. A team of two can produce 700-800
bricks in a single day, and are paid 0.15¥ per brick. Hiring
external labor frees Betsag’s entrepreneurs to transport the
bricks to construction sites where they fetch a higher price.
By 2007 seven households in Betsag received the bulk of
their annual income through brick production. Brick-making
has emerged as an entrepreneurial activity for those who
assume economic risk by hiring labor and purchasing tractors
to transport the finished product to markets. Betsag’s brick
production industry is similar to practices elsewhere in the
world. For example, a study in Mexico found many peasants
are boosting household incomes by excavating aggregates
from agricultural land for use as construction materials
(Fry 2008). However, Fry notes that very little research has
been done on potential environmental impacts of artisanal
quarrying. In the context of rural Tibet, the practice raises a
question: is the quest for short-term profits compromising the
long-term productivity of agricultural land?
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
From Wage Laborer to Contractor
The enormous resources pouring into Tibet through
the Develop the West Campaign have given rise to new offfarm labor opportunities. Many Tibetan’s first exposure to
the construction industry is at the lowest level, as manual
laborers. However, people can make more money as
carpenters, masons, and painters. In 2006 the daily wage for
a manual laborer at a construction site was 20-25¥ per day.
In contrast, daily wages for skilled laborers ranged from 3560¥ per day. Given the wage differential, it is not surprising
that many parents are now seeking apprenticeships for their
teenage sons. Although up-scaling job skills to improve one’s
earning capacity is not an entrepreneurial activity, it can
become a route toward independent contracting which is an
entrepreneurial activity.
The apprenticeship period for carpenters, masons, and
painters lasts from one to three years. Typically, parents
arrange for a son to be tutored by a relative. According to
one apprentice, “It is like a marriage proposal [slong chang].
You bring tea and barley beer to the teacher and clothing for
every person in his household. You formally request to be
his student.” During the apprenticeship the student receives
no salary. In exchange for learning skills, he does menial
tasks like sharpening tools, and prepares food and tea for his
teacher. Once the teacher determines his pupil has acquired
the requisite skills, the student gives parting gifts and serves
his teacher beer in a formal ceremony. Afterwards, he is free
to either remain with the teacher as a salaried employee, or
find work on his own.
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A skilled worker can increase his income by taking on
apprentices. For example, Tsering makes a good living as a
house painter which involves painting elaborate designs on
beams, pillars, window frames, and molding. Since 2003
Tsering has found work in Kongpo where he travels with
a crew that includes four apprentices. Completing a house
interior in 20 days nets Tsering a profit of 2,500¥, which is
considerably more than the 1,200¥ maximum he would earn
at a daily wage of 60¥. The key for Tsering is securing subcontracts on house construction projects, and minimizing his
labor cost by bringing apprentices whom he trains in lieu of
payment. Because his reputation as an independent contractor
is now secure in Kongpo, Tsering envisions boosting his
future workload and profits by taking on more apprentices
and paying regular salaries to some of his graduates. His
activities are entrepreneurial in that he requires capital to
purchase painting supplies and to feed and house his crew,
and assumes the risk of being unable to find enough work to
cover costs.
The amount of work Tsering is able to find as a house
painter is directly related to the construction boom fueled
by the Comfortable Housing Project. The sheer volume of
construction has facilitated the rise of many skilled workers
who seek contracts to build entire houses rather than settling
for daily wages to complete specific tasks. Typically, these
men start as carpenters or masons who are exposed to a range
of activities that teach them how to manage constructing an
entire building: how to formulate a budget, deal with clients,
recruit workers, manage a workforce, purchase materials,
and secure transportation for materials and crew to the work
site. For example, Tenzin is an enterprising young man from
Sogang who completed his apprenticeship as a carpenter in
2004. In 2007 his teacher secured a contract to build 60
houses. Tenzin asked for and received a sub-contract to build
two of the houses on his own. At the time of our interview,
he was recruiting a labor force that included 30 skilled and
unskilled workers from the area around his village. Tenzin
expects to make a profit of 15,000¥ from his sub-contract, a
substantial increase over the daily wages he could earn as a
carpenter.
Gyaltsen, a mason, received his first contract from
villagers who recognized his intelligence and high skill level.
He explained the process,
First you negotiate a price, and then make a
contract. The contract is only between the house
owner and the contractor; there are no offices
involved. It is a written contract with thumb
prints. The house owners are Tibetan, so the
contracts are written in Tibetan. Two copies are
made and signed by both people. Each keeps a
copy. If you have to go to court, the signatures
are on the paper.
The size of the contract is based on the
square meters of the house. The cost is 90¥

per square meter for a mud brick house, and
120¥ for a stone brick house. If the owner is
not so smart, then I make the house design.
If the owner is intelligent, then he makes the
house design. The owner of the house then
gives me money for expenses [materials, labor,
cigarettes, and food]—but not all the money.
After the house is complete the owner pays the
balance except for 3,000¥. I get that after three
years. The contract extends for three years. If
the house falls apart or is damaged within that
period I must rebuild it.

Gyaltsen recently earned a profit of 6,000¥ for building
a house. Had he worked as a salaried mason he would have
earned less than 2,000¥. He has become a rural entrepreneur
by securing operating capital, establishing legally-binding
contracts, and taking financial risks in the hope of earning far
more than he could by merely selling his labor.
Tractors, Trucks, and Upward Mobility
Villagers in our research area envision vehicle ownership
as a potential route to upward mobility. In a survey we asked
heads of households, “What is the best way to get rich?” More
than a third of Betsag’s respondents answered, “buy a truck”.
This is a relatively recent phenomenon because private
vehicle ownership was prohibited during the collective
period from the 1960s to 1982. In 1984 the government
began encouraging people to buy tractors so that they could
earn money. Migmar was reluctant to participate in such a
program, but was pressured to do so by township officials:
I was a village leader, so I had almost no choice . .
. The government paid all of our transportation,
food, and lodging expenses to Golmud [Qinghai
Province where they collected the tractors].
Then we drove the tractors home.

Migmar did not regret the decision. Within a few years
he and his partner were making 80¥ per day—a very high
income at that time—transporting sand from a riverbed to
construction sites in Shigatse. Many villagers bought tractors
once they saw how much he was earning. For example,
Sangpo sold a yak and borrowed money from a relative
to buy a tractor in the 1990s for 7,500¥. After learning to
drive it at a construction site in Gyantse, he decided to try
his luck in Lhasa using it to transport pilgrims. This proved
profitable and in a few months he had made enough money
to repay most of his loans. But then, according to Sangpo, the
government began to crack down:

don’t prevent them from moving people about
then we’ll stop paying taxes.” Since then, the
authorities took the situation seriously. Before,
they didn’t prevent us from moving people. We
had a good business, but then weren’t permitted
to do it anymore. . . . Then there was a tea house
being built that needed materials. Through other
drivers I came to know the boss so I started to
move earth . . . If you work hard you can move
five or six loads in a day, and can earn about 25¥
per load.
Nowadays there is more competition. There
are more people like me earning money in the
city. In past years, the boss asked me to move
sand. Now I have to ask the boss if he has sand
to move.

Despite the increase in competition, people are still
finding tractor driving more lucrative than manual labor. For
example, Rinchen recently found a job at a construction site
in Lhasa. He recalls,
While working [as a manual laborer] I saw
that others were using small tractors to make
money. I rushed home, borrowed some money,
returned to Lhasa and bought a small tractor
[for 12,000¥]. I worked one month and 20 days
and earned 7,000¥ by moving loads.

Had he worked as a laborer at 25¥ per day, Rinchen would
have earned only 1,250¥. However, he still needs to repay the
tractor loan so his increased income comes with financial risk.
Around 1995 dump trucks began to supplant tractors in
the construction industry. Dump trucks have the advantages
of speed, larger payloads, and less labor because nobody
needs to unload them. Soon, tractor drivers found it difficult
to compete with truck drivers for jobs. Recognizing this,
Migmar (the above-mentioned tractor owner) bought a truck
in 1997 for 75,000¥. By doing so, and training his son to
drive it, the family increased its income considerably. Driving
the truck at construction sites brought the household 70,000¥
in 2005, boosting their total income for that year to 87,400¥,
or more than double Betsag’s average.
Village
Sogang

Norgyong
Betsag

Minibus drivers were critical of us small tractor
drivers. They went to the Transportation
Management Office and said, “We pay taxes
but the small tractor drivers don’t. If you

Year

own a vehicle

1997

0.0

own a small
tractor
10.0

2006

3.3

55.4

1997

9.1

22.9

2006

23.6

67.4

2006

27.6

86.7

Table 3: Percentage of households owning vehicles and small tractors. Source:
Goldstein, Childs, and Wangdui 2008.
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Table 3 documents the rising percentages of households
that own vehicles (mainly trucks) and small tractors. Tractors
provide dual functions as construction transportation
vehicles and agricultural machinery, whereas trucks are used
specifically to earn income at construction sites. The most
recent trend has truck owners selling older, smaller trucks
to buy larger vehicles in response to equipment changes and
increasing competition. For example, Namgyal sold an older
truck for 65,000¥. He used this cash and a bank loan to buy
a larger truck for 230,000¥. He reasoned,
It’s easier to get jobs with a big truck.
Backhoe drivers prefer to load bigger trucks.
Also, sometimes the road is bad or steep at
construction sites. Small trucks can’t climb up,
but big trucks have more power. Furthermore, if
you don’t get a job at a project site, then you can
transport loads of cement or other goods. Big
trucks can carry more.

To repay the loan, Namgyal went to Ngari (Western Tibet)
to work on a government road building project. He traveled
with an assistant who received 1,000¥ in monthly salary, plus
learned how to drive. Namgyal transported beer and other
goods to sell near the construction site to offset costs incurred
by the long drive.
At the remote construction site drivers were housed in
tents provided by the Han contractor. Each tent’s residents
pooled tsampa, flour, and cooking fuel, and contributed
cash to a common pot to buy vegetables, rice, and meat.
They transported loads of earth and stone from 8:00 a.m.
to 8:00 p.m. with a one-hour lunch break. Every time a
driver delivered a load he was issued a ticket which he later
redeemed for cash. Through Namgyal’s work, his household’s
income of 176,309¥ was roughly five times Betsag’s average.
Some households are now making large-scale investments
in trucks and construction equipment in an effort to secure
government contracts. For example, Dawa and his two adult
sons formed a construction company that specializes in
building roads. He owns cement mixers, trucks, and earth
moving vehicles, and has three full-time employees. The
government recently awarded Dawa a contract to build a
stretch of road. When we asked Dawa how he got started in
the business, he responded,
In the past I was doing jobs such as masonry.
Then I bought a small truck that I drove for
income. Afterwards I bought another small
truck, then a bigger truck. Gradually I realized
that I could organize construction jobs, so in
2004 I got a government license for a company.
I couldn’t get the license directly, but had to find
somebody I had a relationship with to process
it. I proceeded slowly, found a relationship, and
then eventually got the license. I had to pay
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some bribes, 4,000-5,000¥. After paying that I
didn’t have to pay for the license.

Dawa’s contracts are awarded by various government
agencies. When a project is announced the agency solicits
bids, then decides who will get the contract. In 2005 Dawa
and his two sons had a net income of 280,000¥ from the
contracting business, which is more than ten times Norgyong’s
average household income of 24,112¥.
The purchasing of tractors and trucks qualifies as an
entrepreneurial activity because rural Tibetans are taking
financial risks and acting as independent suppliers of services
in a quest to make profits. Despite numerous success stories,
every village has examples of people who have not succeeded
to the level of their expectations. For example, Norbu is an
elderly man who laments the rusting truck that sits idle in the
family’s yard. He bought the truck in 2000 expecting his son
to earn income at construction sites. According to Norbu’s
son,
The first time I drove the truck was to Gyantse in
2000. I didn’t know how to drive. It was a new
truck, so we hired a teacher. The profit for three
months work was 2,400¥. When I returned my
father said sarcastically, “Such big money! That
can’t even cover the salary of the teacher.” These
days our truck cannot make money. Gas prices
are high, and the government taxes trucks a lot.
I want to sell the truck, borrow some money and
buy a bigger one. But my father doesn’t agree.

Norbu, who openly refers to his son as “the incompetent
head of my household”, is reluctant to risk more capital on a
truck. After all, the family already squandered 78,000¥ on a
vehicle that his son failed to convert into a reliable source of
income.
Competition and Shifting Trends
Because successes outnumber failures, villagers continue
to invest in vehicles as a proven method to increase their
household incomes. Nevertheless, several vehicle owners
expressed wariness about competition in the construction
industry, and see transportation as a more viable long-term
option. One truck owner summarized this position by saying,
“I think that moving people will be better in the future. Jobs
moving earth and stone are difficult to find.” He plans to buy
a minibus in a year or two. Another man who earns income
by driving his tractor to distant construction sites thinks he
cannot raise the 250,000¥ in capital to buy a large dump
truck. Instead, he plans to save 24,000¥ and then take a bank
loan of 16,000¥ to buy a minibus.
Lhawang, who lives in Sogang with his wife and three
children could not support his family on their limited land so
he bought a small tractor and drove it to Shigatse in search of
work. With his earnings and a loan from a relative, he bought

a minibus in 2003. Lhawang set his route from the highest
village in the valley to Panam, the district headquarters. He
charged 11¥ per passenger including luggage. On a bad day
he would barely cover petrol costs, but on a good day he
could net 300¥. However, Lhawang had to pay several taxes
amounting to more than 20,000¥ per year. Furthermore,
he could only afford dilapidated vehicles which the police
sometimes confiscated for safety reasons. They even forced
him to sell one bus for scrap metal because it was in such poor
condition. Despite such persistent obstacles, Lhawang’s 2005
income of 37,000¥ was considerably higher than Sogang’s
average household income of 10,332¥.
By 2009 Lhawang had sold the last of his minibuses for
27,000¥ to a man living further up the valley, and bought a
used pick-up truck for 46,000¥. According to him, minibuses
weren’t as convenient to operate because they were subject to
too many regulations. He explained,
The minibus was a problem. The police check it
often, and there are many regulations. You can
only work one line and can’t go elsewhere. That
limited my earnings, so I sold the bus. Now I
have a pick-up truck and am more flexible. I can
go where I want [to pick up riders] and when
the police check I say, “These are my relatives.”
My income is fairly similar to when I had the
minibus, but work is much easier now. I charge
5¥ per passenger from here to Panam and can
get 8-10 passengers per trip. There are not many
seats, so I just squeeze them in.

Now that Lhawang has a mobile phone clients can
contact him from afar to book trips. His schedule and routes
are flexible, and on average he makes 200¥ per day which
more than covers his costs that include gas, repairs, taxes,
insurance, and an annual inspection fee. Once he has earned
enough money, Lhawang plans to buy a better vehicle and
continue with this business.
RETAIL BUSINESS AND COTTAGE INDUSTRIES
Pemba of Norgyong is a rural entrepreneur who has
succeeded in the retail business. In 1984, when he was 19
years old, he saw a television program featuring people in
Lhasa who were opening retail stores. This inspired Pemba to
set off on his own venture. He recalls,
I borrowed 200¥ from the bank. That was a
large sum of money back then. I was worried
about losing it on the trip to Lhasa so I stuffed
it into my underwear. I have an elder sister in
Lhasa. She said, “You can’t do business with
200¥.” She gave me another 800¥.
I went to the market to buy clothing. I found
some new army jackets for wholesale. Each cost
5¥. I thought they were good and the price

seemed cheap, so I spent 100¥ on those. Selling
them back home I could get 10¥ or sometimes
even 15¥.
I bought a bicycle and a cart and rode from
one village to another to sell the clothing. Later
I bought a donkey, made a cart and went selling
from one village to the next. I would exchange
clothing for cash or barley, and then resell the
barley. I opened my first shop 16 years ago
[1990]. At first I was amazed to be making a
profit of 2,000¥ in a year. At that time a laborer
would make 1-2¥ per day.
There are more stores nowadays. Selling
used to be easy. You just set a price and went
to the villages. In the past everybody worried
that they would not have a chance to buy,
whereas now you need to encourage people to
buy. Profits are decreasing because locals have
opened more shops, and Chinese are coming
here to sell goods so it is very difficult.

Pemba’s business nets 37,000¥ in income for the family
in a village where the average household income is 24,112¥.
However, after 22 years in the retail clothing business, Pemba
is shifting his capital into other ventures such as a commercial
apple orchard and an outdoor leisure park where tourists and
local officials can have picnics, drink beer, and play games.
In the meantime, Pemba is training his daughter to take over
management of his retail business.
Weaving has always been a highly valued skill among
women in rural Tibet. Nowadays, some women are using this
skill to generate income for their households. For example,
Pentok from Sogang reported that, because her family has few
fields, she has free time to weave coarse woolen cloth (snam
bu) and fine woolen cloth (shad ma) for clothing. Pentok
is recognized locally for her exceptional skill, so she takes
orders from other households in the village. Depending on
her family’s needs, she barters some products for food and
sells others for cash. She recently scaled production upward
because her brother who works in distant Nagchu found
a market for her goods, prompting Pentok to hire a local
woman on a part-time basis to help fulfill orders. Pentok’s
home-based weaving industry nets a profit of 7,000¥ per year,
which helps boost her household’s annual income to more
than double Sogang’s average.
Whereas Pentok is a small-scale, village-based
entrepreneur, two women in Norgyong are creating much
larger operations. Nyima produces woolen carpets, aprons,
and bolts of fine woolen cloth. She turned to business after
bad relations in her polyandrous marriage forced her to
establish an independent household. As an impoverished
divorcee raising a disabled daughter, she got a bank loan to
open a restaurant in Penam. Nyima ran that for three years,
and in the meantime began making money by weaving.
According to Nyima,
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Because we [initially] had no bedding in my
house, I bought some wool to make some.
There was leftover wool, so I thought, “I can
make carpets and earn some money.” I made
some carpets and sold them to acquaintances.
They didn’t refuse to buy them; I was poor so
they had sympathy. I slowly realized that I could
make money this way, so I sold more carpets
to acquaintance. They liked to buy them. Now
I have two carpet looms and six looms for
producing fine woolen cloth.

Nyima hires workers and provides a loom and raw
materials so they can weave in their own homes on a contract
basis. Mainly through word of mouth, demand for Nyima’s
products has risen. She sells some carpets and bolts of cloth
locally, but has also found a market in Lhasa. She explained,
I’m a person who knows how to weave and
who therefore maintains high quality control.
Because my products are high quality, more and
more people are asking me to make cloth for
them. Last year, before Losar (the Tibetan New
Year), I had so many orders that I couldn’t fill
them on time. If I had more money to invest, I
could earn more.

In 2006 Nyima earned a net profit of 50,000¥, which is
double Norgyong’s average household income of 24,112¥.
By consistently repaying bank loans her solid credit rating
provides access to more capital. Importantly, Nyima envisions
herself as a provider of opportunities for other women. She
prefers to employ women from poorer households, including
divorcees like her who need to make an independent living.
Chogpa is even further along in expanding her handicraft
business. Born into a household that traditionally specialized
in the production of woolen cloth, she learned to weave at a
young age. Around 1995 Chogpa was in her 30s, unmarried,
and living in her parents’ home. She asked a local lama to
ordain her as a nun. The lama advised that she was too old
to become a nun, but instead could practice compassion by
assisting poor people. Chogpa took this as her life’s mission
and invested savings to start a small weaving business with six
employees. She explained,
In the beginning it was hard to sell my products.
I’d go to a festival in Shigatse and sell items
on the street. I would walk from Gyantse to
Shigatse. Each night I’d ask for a place to stay
in someone’s home, and would sell items.
Gradually many people came to know me, and
trusted my quality. They placed orders. I moved
to Penam in 2004 and set up a factory.
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By 2009 Chogpa had a thriving business. She received
support from local government leaders, and from various
public and private offices such as the TAR Women’s Federation
and Tibet Poverty Alleviation Fund. All of her 45 female
weavers are recruited from poor families. When we asked
why she employs impoverished women, Chogpa responded,
On the one hand I’m practicing what the lama
said. On the other hand, all levels of government
now encourage the rich to help the poor, so I’m
following that policy. I’ve been born into this
world, and in the future I will die. I want to set
a good example for others. After I die I want the
poor people who received my assistance to say,
“She was good. She helped the poor a lot.”

With net profits ranging between 500,000¥ and 600,000¥
annually, Chogpa’s income is twenty times higher than the
average household income in Norgyong. At the time of our
last visit in July, 2009, she had nearly completed construction
on a large factory complex.
A NEW ECONOMIC ELITE?
Table 4 compares household incomes of selected
entrepreneurs with average household incomes in the villages
where they live. Although there is considerable range in the
amount of income that entrepreneurs generate, they tend
to make more money than those who only farm and work
for wages. Even the relatively small-scale entrepreneurial
households rank in the top tier of household incomes. Tibetan
entrepreneurs, like their counterparts elsewhere in China, are
emerging as new economic elites in the countryside.
Although the rapid rise of entrepreneurial opportunities
may be contributing to a widening income gap in Tibetan
villages, rural entrepreneurs can mitigate the situation by
employing people from poorer households. Nyima and
Chogpa, the weaving business owners described above, both
spoke about employment as a means to assist impoverished
women. Although no village-based contractors we interviewed
mentioned selecting employees from poor households, those
we interviewed hire the vast majority of their workforce
locally and tend to employ a mix of friends and relatives. The
rise of rural entrepreneurs is therefore affecting local hiring
practices, and if the trend continues then more Tibetans are
likely to work under Tibetan bosses in the future.
THE ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSITION IN RURAL
TIBET
In this paper we have documented the emergence of
rural Tibetan entrepreneurs who are finding opportunities
to make money through farm-based initiatives, construction
contracting, vehicle ownership, cottage industries, and
retail business. The fact that so many people are pursuing
entrepreneurial activities in rural Tibet contradicts the “trope
of indolence” idiom in development discourse and state

ideology which assumes that Tibetans lag behind the rest
of China because they lack the motivation and work ethic
to uplift their standard of living (Yeh 2007). Nevertheless,
Fischer (2005) and Wang (2009) have both highlighted real
and persistent obstacles that inter-ethnic competition poses
for Tibetans who wish to work in cities. Their research findings
beg the question: Can Tibetan entrepreneurs compete with
non-Tibetan entrepreneurs in today’s economy? This question
is especially pertinent in Tibet because, unlike eastern China
where people of similar cultural and linguistic backgrounds
comprise the pool of competitors, Tibetan entrepreneurs
operate in an environment where they must contend with
non-Tibetans who have more business experience, better
education, speak better Chinese, have a better understanding
of China’s business culture, and have more connections to
political and economic elites. To a certain degree the situation
is mitigated by the fact that many rural Tibetans are finding
their entrepreneurial niches not in cities, but in other rural
areas where they do not face as much competition with nonTibetans.
In some niche industries, like woolen garment production,
being Tibetan may have an advantage because ethnicity is
closely associated with the manufactured products (e.g.,
woolen clothing, aprons, etc). On the other hand, Tibetan
ethnicity probably has no competitive advantage in the
construction industry. Village leaders informed us that the
government typically awards large contracts to Han-owned
companies, presumably because they have more capital,
machinery, and expertise than locally-owned companies.
Local companies, at best, are awarded sub-contracts for

portions of a project. According to one Tibetan contractor,
even at the sub-contract level he must compete with small,
Han-owned companies. Sometimes he wins the contracts,
other times he loses. But in his opinion, local cadres give some
preference to Tibetan contractors who have good equipment
and a solid track record. Despite competition from outsiders,
many Tibetans are investing in heavy equipment with the
hope of finding a space in Tibet’s booming construction
industry. In 2006 we knew of six households in Betsag
and three in Norgyong that had established constructing
contracting businesses. As Tibetans gain more experience
and capital, the number of Tibetan-owned and operated
contracting companies is likely to increase, and Tibetans are
likely to capture a larger proportion of lower-end construction
contracts throughout Tibet.
The future prosperity of rural Tibet is closely linked to
government policies because so much of Tibet’s current
economic climate is driven by government expenditures
(Fischer 2009, see also Fischer this volume). In fact, the
upsurge of entrepreneurial activities we documented is linked
to the Develop the West Campaign, and some niches (e.g.,
house construction contractors) are directly related to the
Comfortable Housing Program. Furthermore, the government
facilitates entrepreneurial opportunities by providing
relatively easy access to capital in the form of bank loans and
government grants. This does not mean that rural Tibetan
entrepreneurs are dependent on the government for success,
or that entrepreneurs have only arisen because of the Develop
the West Campaign. Prior to 2000 some people in our research
area were starting enterprises, and non-farm work was
already becoming more
important as a household
2005 HH Income
HH Income’s Rank
Enterprise
Village
% Diff. from Mean*
economic diversification
(¥)
(HHs)
strategy. However, what
Ngödrup, Brick
Betsag
39,895
11.6
30 (93)
Production
differs today is that more
Pasang, Pig/Sheep
people are able to make or
Norgyong
36,002
49.3
22 (124)
Farm
borrow money, and with
Pemba, Retail
Norgyong
40,353
67.4
18
(124)
the increase of economic
Business
activity throughout Tibet
Nyima, Weaving
Norgyong
40,400
67.6
17 (124)
Factory
more people are finding
entrepreneurial
niches
Khangchen, Cheese
Betsag
61,138
71.0
20 (93)
Factory
and taking financial risks
Gyaltsen, Small
in the hope of enhancing
Sogang
19,627
90.0
8 (92)
Contractor
their household incomes.
Pentok, Home
Sogang
22,500
117.8
7 (92)
While some business
Weaver
ventures will no doubt
Migmar, Truck
Betsag
88,149
146.5
4 (93)
Owner/Operator
fail—and some already
Lhawang, Minibus
have—it
is
evident
Sogang
38,500
272.6
4(
92)
Owner/Operator
that an entrepreneurial
Namgyal, Truck
Betsag
176,309
393.0
1 (93)
transition is underway.
Owner/Operator
But
because
the
Dawa, Contracting
Norgyong
280,000
1,061.2
2 (124)
Business
entrepreneurial transition
is highly dependent
Table 4: Rural Entrepreneurs and Household Incomes.
the government’s
* 2005 mean household incomes were 35,759¥ in Betsag, 24,112¥ in Norgyong, and 10,332¥ in Sogang. Source: Goldstein, on
Childs, and Wangdui 2008.
development policy, it is
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unclear whether the momentum we witnessed from 1997 to
2009 is sustainable over the long-term, and if so, how it will
transform social, political, and cultural life in the countryside.
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